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In 1942, under the shadow of World War II and the distressing situation of a 
divided and occupied France, Jacques Maritain wrote a small book which he 
described as “an essay in political philosophy.”1 The author felt that not only 
civilization was at stake, but the need to win the peace after winning the war. 
This required a political philosophy able to keep totalitarianism at bay. Mari-
tain was among the most famous French neo-Thomist philosophers, having 
written extensively about Aquinas’s metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy 
of nature, and ethics, but his own contribution to political matters had 
hitherto been scarce. It would probably have remained in the background 
had it not been for his active involvement in the UNESCO commission that 
debated the philosophical basis of the yet unborn Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. The book-essay, entitled Les droits de l’homme et la loi natu-
relle, starts from the relations between person and society and argues that 
the recognition of the dignity of the human person had its apex in “Christian 
philosophy,” notwithstanding the acknowledgment of other contributions. 
1  Jaques Maritain, Les droits de l’homme et la loi naturelle (Paris: Paul Hartmann Éditeur, 1943), 7. 
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The fundamental thesis of the book is that while the human person is by 
nature political and human society is a requirement of man’s nature, the 
individual person matters. Political philosophy, “under penalty of denatural-
izing itself, implies the acknowledgment of the fundamental rights of the 
person”2—including the aspiration to liberty. “Natural Law and the light of 
conscience do not merely prescribe what to do, or not to do, but acknowledge 
rights, in particular the rights tied to the very nature of man.”3 To sum up, 
Natural Law leads to the recognition of the rights of man as its corollary.
Pierre Manent, Raymond Aron’s faithful assistant at the Collège de 
France, who nevertheless has declared himself in recent interviews to be 
intellectually closer to Leo Strauss than to Aron, has just published a small 
book with a title that seems to pay homage to Maritain’s essay. The title, how-
ever, inverts the expressions and it reads instead La loi naturelle et les droits 
de l’homme. The book, while also concerned with a theme that both authors 
call the naturalization and denaturalization of man,4 reverses not only the 
title but Maritain’s fundamental thesis, despite Manent sharing with him a 
Thomism of sorts (through Louis Jugnet).5 According to Manent, the lan-
guage of human rights is in opposition to Natural Law, which, he argues, has 
been radically discredited by modern philosophy and despised by enlightened 
opinion, owing either to its archaism or to its opposition to the recognition 
and enforcement of human rights (1). To sum up, the rights of man necessar-
ily result in the concealment of Natural Law.
Manent’s recent book seems particularly harsh on the philosophy of 
human rights, often making sweeping statements (most of which the author 
of this review is in agreement with), and is always interesting and insightful. 
The book is probably the most important and ambitious work by Manent 
to date. Human rights theories are re-chartering all social life, and Manent 
aims at questioning and re-chartering the field of “human rights” theories, 
providing an original account of the modern state. We are in need of a map. 
This review essay’s focus is on situating the work in the landscape of studies 
of human rights and, more closely, in the author’s intellectual itinerary, while 
2  Ibid., 15.
3  Ibid., 67.
4  See Pierre Manent, La loi naturelle et les droits de l’homme (Paris: PUF, 2018), 12–13, with Maritain, 
Droits de l’homme, 15. Parenthetical page references will be to the book here under review.
5  Pierre Manent, Seeing Things Politically: Interviews with Benedicte Delorme-Montini (South Bend, 
IN: St. Augustine’s, 2010), 20–21; see on Strauss 49ff.; on the “triangle” Aron, Strauss, Maritain-
Aquinas see 59ff.
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marking the divergences and convergences between him and the philoso-
phers that most influenced him: Aron and Strauss.
I
The book was published a few weeks ago by the Presses Universitaires de 
France and is based on the six lectures given in the context of the Étienne 
Gilson Chair of Metaphysics, created in 1995 at the School of Philosophy of 
the Institut Catholique de Paris. The chair is generally awarded to a single 
holder by invitation, taking into consideration his reputation in historical 
or speculative research in the field of metaphysics, and involves delivering a 
lecture series in French. (Manent curiously mentions the word “metaphysics” 
only a couple of times, and as a close synonym of “chimera.”) 
The book opens provocatively with a “great contradiction” or an inde-
structible knot. Following in Strauss’s footsteps in Natural Right and History, 
Manent argues that the notion of natural law, which in the past was at the 
center of political debate, is now forgotten, though not completely dishon-
ored, since it is maintained within a certain Catholic tradition.
The impossibility of undoing the knot reveals itself in our present situ-
ation, which the author seeks to describe in a somewhat cavalier but not 
inaccurate survey (2). There is an undeniable duality of criteria between the 
West (ici) and the Rest (ailleurs). We live here. “We” are the citizens of mod-
ern democracies who adhere to the idea of justice that the Enlightenment 
has validated. In the West, the most venerable institutions are now subject 
to an unrestricted criticism that evaluates and reforms everything according 
to the standard of human rights. One sign of the severity of this evaluation, 
and of its dogmatism, is the request for public recognition for LGBT lifestyles 
and the enforcement of this criterion “without precaution or reservation” (5). 
The new discourse implies a metaphysical claim, which shouts: There is no 
Natural Law (18). Manent asks himself why so many citizens embrace these 
ideas as such evident and salutary truths that they call for the intervention of 
the secular arm of positive law. Later in the book he explains how destructive 
of social ties the philosophy of human rights is for society, to the extent that 
they involve the consideration of abortion, divorce, and euthanasia as human 
rights (as opposed, say, to lesser evils).
Here (ici) in the West, then, a desire to severely judge and to reform 
everything prevails. When, on the other hand, we speak of what goes on 
outside the West, abroad (ailleurs), it is our duty to avoid any evaluation, to 
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“neutrally” contemplate all mores and traditions, the exotic, even the most 
barbaric, as an ethnologist or a tourist would contemplate them. The clearest 
sign of this “schizophrenia” is the attitude towards Islam: rights are universal, 
but cultures are all of equal value and we must refrain from all indignation 
(4).
The duality of criteria, which seems to us to be in need of nuance, is cer-
tainly one that invites reflection. How convincing really is the argument that 
this reveals “a sickness of judgment” (7)? Not very. 
On the contrary, it seems reasonable to defend such duality between 
“thick” or maximalist moral arguments “at home”6 and “thin” or minimalist 
moral arguments “abroad,” for purely prudential reasons. Even in Manent’s 
own terms, within the framework of the Greek city, or of the modern nation—
that is, according to him, the two most important political forms, which are 
the result of two “revolutions” in the dynamics of the West (94)7—we can, and 
the philosopher should, certainly judge the “soul” of these regimes. Within 
a familiar culture, we can devise a republic in words that are the yardstick 
for evaluating extant regimes. Abroad, and just as we enter new territory 
and move away from what is familiar to us in time or space, some cautious 
abstention from “strong” evaluations may be preferable, at least before we 
are able to understand others as they understand themselves. Moreover, the 
social scientist studying different civilizations and “tribes” does not wish to 
remain enmeshed in a learned parochialism.8
More promising is the idea that such “division and re-composition” 
between the “at home” and “abroad” has now become more complex with the 
arrival of those who come from outside and live among us. The clash between 
the various cultures and tribes has been what in the past triggered an inquiry 
into the nature of things and made us question the equation of the ancestral 
with the good, the natural with the manmade or conventional, the divine 
with the human.
6  Charles Taylor, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame, IN: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1994). Even if we do not embrace this “division of the self” in the terms in which 
Taylor defends it, a duality of sorts seems to us unavoidable.
7  See also Pierre Manent, La raison des nations: Enquête sur la souveraineté nationale et les fonde-
ments de la démocratie (Paris: Gallimard, 2006), 1: “Une forme politique—la nation, la cité—ce n’est 
pas un léger vêtement que l’on peut prendre et déposséder à volonté en restant ce que l’on est. Elle est 
ce Tout dans lequel tous les éléments de notre vie se rassemblent et prennent sens.” 
8  See Leo Strauss, “The Frame of Reference in the Social Sciences,” Leo Strauss Papers, box 14, folder 
10, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.
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Even if we were able to discard entirely the duality of criteria that Manent 
calls the “great contradiction,” his instincts about our current predicament 
are surely right. Even those who, like him, defend the rights of nation-states 
to control immigration often resort to a rationale about human rights that 
can lead to the type of infinite extension of these rights that Manent fears.9
Successive waves or generations of “new rights” thus aim to eliminate all 
obstacles to individual freedom. The right to a universal income, for example, 
reveals according to Manent a profound trend in our society (91–92).
II
Manent thinks that the authority of human rights derives from their pre-
sumed universality. This assertion, made in passing (5), requires an important 
qualification: if this certainly applies to the rights theories within modern 
philosophy generally, it is more problematic as regards the current version 
of those theories, at least since 1948. We now know better the intricacies 
involved in the Universal Declaration drafting process, since sources such 
as memoirs and the personal correspondence of its main protagonists have 
come to light.10 Most such “narratives” obviously have, in tone if not in every 
detail, the character of a celebration, but most scholars agree that the problem 
of the universality of the new declaration cast a long shadow over the work of 
the UN human rights commission in charge of drafting the declaration. As 
soon as the plan was announced, the American Anthropological Association 
advised that the document should not be “conceived only in terms of the 
prevalent values in the countries of Western Europe and America.”11 Serious 
doubts were raised early on about whether it would be possible to prepare a 
9 Although motivated by the same gut feeling as Manent as regards immigration, David Miller, for 
example, re-examines how the possibility of recognizing human rights is ascertained. The possible 
criteria he addresses are three: a specific right is necessary to fulfill an essential human need (direct 
argument); a right that is a means to realizing other, directly grounded rights (instrumental argu-
ment); and the rights recognized by a process known as “cantilever,” that is, levered or anchored in 
existing rights, because of the similarity with other rights already included in extant charters, which 
would make the rejection of new rights inconsistent. See David Miller, Strangers in Our Midst: The 
Political Philosophy of Immigration (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016). See however 
Joseph H. Carens, The Ethics of Immigration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 245: “cantilever 
argument is only as strong as the foundation on which it rests.”
10  The best accounts of the drafting of the Universal Declaration are Mary Ann Glendon, A World 
Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random 
House, 2001); Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Philadel-
phia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003); and Johannes Morsink, Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999). 
11  American Anthropological Association, “Statement on Human Rights,” 539.
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document that all the represented nations would accept.12 The framers of the 
declaration were more aware of the rupture with the past they were aiming 
at than the more recent defenders of human rights.
Let us briefly recall some details in the drafting of the Universal Declara-
tion. Among the delegates to the San Francisco conference that established the 
United Nations was a young Lebanese philosopher, Charles Malik, a Greek-
Orthodox Arab who had completed his PhD at Harvard on “The Metaphysics 
of Time in the Philosophies of Whitehead and Heidegger.” Upon arriving, 
he noted that many delegates from small countries, especially from Latin 
America, were disappointed with the agenda of the major powers. Malik 
also questioned the idea that it would be possible to maintain peace without 
addressing the underlying causes of conflicts. Eleanor Roosevelt, presiding 
over the drafting committee, later on declared: “Many of us thought that 
lack of standards for human rights the world over was one of the greatest 
causes of friction among the nations, and that recognition of human rights 
might become one of the cornerstones upon which peace could eventually 
be based.”13 The Chinese nationalist delegate Peng-Chun Chang was the vice 
president of the commission, and Charles Malik was responsible for prepar-
ing the official reports of the group. Chang was educated in the 1920s under 
John Dewey at Columbia University and his frequent quotes from Confucius 
were often merely pragmatic suggestions for compromise.14
“Universality” was wishful thinking. Julian Huxley, the UNESCO direc-
tor, upon hearing about the project created his own commission to investigate 
the potential for agreement among cultures. This other commission was pre-
sided over by the Marxist historian E. H. Carr and included Richard McKeon, 
a philosopher from the University of Chicago, and the neo-Thomist philoso-
pher Jacques Maritain, who would become one of its most active members. 
The UNESCO commission sent questions to statesmen and academics 
around the world, including such figures as Mahatma Gandhi, Benedetto 
Croce, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and Aldous Huxley. To the commission’s 
surprise the lists of basic rights coming from the four corners of the globe 
12  Indeed, the document to be drafted had to be vetted by delegates representing four-fifths of the 
world’s population. Of the original members of the UN, six belonged to the Soviet bloc, eleven were 
of Islamic culture; four had a large Buddhist population and thirty-seven were marked by Judeo-
Christian culture and the Enlightenment.
13  Eleanor Roosevelt, “The Promise of Human Rights,” Foreign Affairs, April 1948, 470, 473. 
14  On Chang, see Glendon, A World Made New, 33. According to his colleagues’ memoirs, he was at 
bottom a pragmatist. See John P. Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adven-
ture (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational, 1984), 17.
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were roughly similar. The McKeon report concluded that it would be possible 
to reach agreement across cultures on certain rights which “may be viewed as 
implicit in the individual and individual nature of society.”15 This optimism 
was not confirmed in the course of the drafting process, nor is “consensual” 
the right word to describe the final declaration, which is at best a problematic 
“compromise.” The illusion of consistency is the work of another dominant 
figure in the commission: the French jurist René Cassin. He was commis-
sioned to give order to documents already prepared by John Humphrey, a 
Canadian academic and diplomat. Cassin was a secular Jew who had been 
a legal adviser to Charles de Gaulle. Thanks to Cassin, the document that 
emerged from the working group was an instance of continental codification 
in the Napoleonic tradition. 
Approval of the final document was far from secure throughout the 
process.16 Surprisingly, and although the debates dragged on for months, in 
the evening of December 4 the committee sent the document to the Gen-
eral Assembly for final approval. It was approved without any vote against 
and only eight (but significant) abstentions: the Saudis did not approve of 
marriage and divorce “by choice,” the South Africans did not approve of 
“nondiscrimination,” and some communists rejected “individualistic” 
political rights. Roosevelt, Malik, Maritain, McKeon, Cassin, Chang, and 
their colleagues had succeeded while remaining aware of the fragility of the 
document and the problems in its implementation. There was almost never 
universal agreement, and often not even a universal compromise.17 
The framers of the contemporary Declaration of Human Rights were 
aware of its “novelty.” Malik’s presentation speech, on December 8, emphasized 
that, contrary to previous statements of rights, which had roots in particular 
cultures, this new Universal Declaration broke new ground, for it was “a com-
posite synthesis of all these outlooks and movements and of much Oriental 
and Latin American wisdom.”18 Malik’s own philosophy had been challenged 
15  UNESCO, Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations (London: Wingate, 1949), 259.
16  On the contrary, at the time, each delay made the prospects darker with the onset of the Cold War 
and the problem of Palestine and the new State of Israel dividing the commission itself. See Hum-
phrey, Human Rights and the United Nations, 63.
17  The statement is nonetheless undoubtedly a monument, like the Justinian Corpus Juris Civilis, the 
Napoleonic Code, or the Constitution of the United States. See Mary Ann Glendon, The Forum and 
the Tower, 218.
18  Charles Malik, speech to the General Assembly, December 9, 1948, in The Challenge of Human 
Rights: Charles Malik and the Universal Declaration, ed. Habib C. Malik (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese 
Studies, 2000), 117.
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both by the Soviet bloc, eager to subordinate the person to the state, and by 
the “individualists” of the West, but Malik’s existential personalism, backed 
by Chang and the Latin Americans, left its mark in the document nonetheless. 
But any position on the ultimate nature of reality was excluded.
To sum up, the agreement was not profound. Maritain related the famous 
story of the man who expressed surprise at the agreement between so many 
different ideologies, to whom the answer would have been: “Yes, we agree on 
the rights, but on condition no one asks us why.”19 Indeed, if we ask “why?” it 
becomes clear that no core values are shared, and not even an “overlapping con-
sensus” is revealed. Universality was largely rhetorical, and for a long time its 
proponents did not consider such a composite to be philosophically interesting. 
Almost no one claims for it perfect consistency. It was not truly universal, but 
it was “new.” Raymond Aron, Manent’s mentor, stressed that despite apparent 
continuities, the new charter, making demands on the state, was essentially dif-
ferent from the French Declaration, which put individual rights in opposition 
to the state (or political authority). Inconsistent, without “whys,” the statement 
was “universal” only in the sense that the extent of its endorsement and its 
ambition was wide, not that it was the fruit of universal agreement. 
III
The so-called human rights philosophy trying to “make sense”20 of these 
rights addresses a wide range of questions about not only their content, 
justification, legal status, and universality, but also about the very existence 
of human rights. Claims in the name of human rights gather strength, as 
Manent asserts, because they are assumed to be independent of cultural and 
legal traditions and justified by higher or universal standards. Such allega-
tions have often caused doubt, leading some (such as Alasdair MacIntyre) 
to say that “there are no such rights, and belief in them is one with belief 
in witches and in unicorns,”21 and some (such as Richard Rorty) to say that 
no justification is necessary, only a sentimental education, since “Serbian 
murderers and rapists…are not being inhuman, but rather are discriminat-
ing between true humans and pseudo-humans.”22 But the new language is 
19  See Maritain, introduction to Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations, 9.
20  See James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), xii 
and ff. 
21  Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 2000), 69.
22  Richard Rorty, “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality,” in Philosophical Papers, vol. 3, 
Truth and Progress (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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pervasive, and it shows the remarkable success of the Universal Declaration. 
Whether to preserve their own power or provide security to those they lead, 
dictators, military factions, and elected officials resort to such means as arbi-
trary detention, torture, murder of political enemies, and even genocide of 
entire populations. Such cases are now described as “human rights viola-
tions” and no longer as immoral, unjust, or even “barbarous” acts (which 
ultimately means strangers to our culture, without implying a hierarchy, as 
Manent notes).23 
Behind the popularity of this “rights talk” is often the assumption (or the 
illusion) that debates about the rationale of universal human rights in a world 
of very diverse beliefs and practices will soon be an obsolete discussion. This 
seems plausible, considering that in recent decades there has been a growing 
acceptance of rights in new parts of the world. Most countries have ratified 
some of the main human rights treaties and are participating in regional con-
ventions with international tribunals.
We may doubt the sincerity of some ratifications, such as that of the USSR 
in Helsinki, which may be merely the hypocritical homage that vice pays to 
virtue, to paraphrase La Rochefoucauld. The declarations are obviously not 
always enforced by their signatories. A rule may even be formulated: the more 
a country violates human rights, the more treaties it subscribes to. Since such 
violations are less frequent in more democratic countries, the benignity of the 
accumulation of treatises can be and has been questioned. But this expansion 
has a simple explanation: many countries use similar political institutions 
(that is, laws, courts, parliaments, executives, regular armies, bureaucra-
cies, police, prisons, taxes, and public schools), which are now widespread 
throughout the world. “Globalization” has already reduced the differences 
between peoples, and eventually will make these differences negligible, or at 
least some dream in this way of a world beyond politics. In short, although 
some advocates of the rights talk, such as Ronald Dworkin and Jeremy Wal-
dron, have come to the fore,24 there is no lack of skeptics of various genres 
and species about human rights philosophy, going back to Bentham, who 
described them as “nonsense on stilts.” 
Manent is among the skeptics. Assistant to Raymond Aron at the Col-
lège de France, friend of Allan Bloom, critical admirer of Leo Strauss—he 
23  See Manent, La loi naturelle, 6–8 with James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, xi.
24  Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978); Jer-
emy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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never understood the figure of the philosopher and is highly critical of what 
he calls Strauss’s “naturalism” or “éléatisme.”25 (!) Manent already wrote his 
own “narrative” of the emergence of human rights in his 2004 book Cours 
familier de philosophie politique.26 He there asserts that “the notion of human 
rights is today the common political and moral reference point in the West” 
and that “every political party, school, and ‘sensibility’ appeals to it,”27 and he 
emphasizes that such unanimity is extremely rare. He suggests that it would 
even be necessary to go back to the fourteenth century to find a similar con-
sensus. The “unanimity” to which he refers is what others have called “rights 
talk.” It is manifest in the fact that even to celebrate “difference,” we claim the 
universal right to difference, conflating two distinct concepts. Yet difference 
can in fact alternatively be supported by a duty: the Muslim difference can be 
framed by the duty to be a Muslim.
In 2004 Manent acknowledged that such unanimity is a recent phe-
nomenon. Although taking root in the charters drafted after the French and 
American Revolutions, it was only in the 1970s and 1980s that it became an 
uncontested reference point in the West.28 Communist dissidents did not 
invoke an alternative regime, but instead demanded respect for human rights, 
that is, for certain elementary principles which the communist governments 
had vowed to respect by signing the Helsinki Accords, including its provision 
about the free movement of people. 
The novelty of the recent human rights movement lies in its apolitical 
nature. Human rights language was not often used in “civic discourse” before 
the 1970s. The 1789 declaration was a declaration of the rights of man and 
citizen. As Aron and Arendt stated, human rights make little sense without 
citizenship. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there was a recurrent 
tendency to inscribe charters of human rights (and sometimes duties) in 
political constitutions, which is why John Humphrey was able to put together 
a volume comprising what the UN proclaimed to be “the most extensive 
documentation on the subject of human rights ever assembled.”29 But the 
framework, as Manent remarks, was that of the nation-state. The situation 
25  Pierre Manent, La cité de l’homme (Paris: Fayard, 1993), 96. See Daniel Tanguay, “Pierre Manent et 
la question de l’homme,” Politique et Sociétés 22, no. 3 (2003): 71–98.
26  Pierre Manent, Cours familier de philosophie politique (Paris: Gallimard, 2004), translated as A World 
beyond Politics? A Defense of the Nation-State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
27  Manent, A World beyond Politics?, 98.
28  Ibid.
29  Human Rights Commission, Third Session (E/CN.4/SR.64, pp. 5–6).
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has changed: “The insistence on human rights today has an undeniably 
anti-political flavor.”30 Military service and even voting are held to be cum-
bersome, if not synonymous with coercion—something that for Manent is 
equivalent to the dismantling of the republic.
Manent’s précis historique did not ignore the opposition to human rights 
by the church, which changed only in 1965, with the Declaration on Religious 
Liberty. This marked the end of the opposition of the rights of God and the 
rights of truth to the rights of man, despite the church, even today, fighting 
against the current on issues such as abortion, sexuality, and marriage. The 
other source of opposition to the language of rights that Manent points to 
was “Burkean.”31 It came from the opposition to a “metaphysical” idea which 
asserted that man was born without ties or chains.32 Marx curiously sided 
with the conservatives and was among those who opposed human rights as 
illusory, and Manent pays homage to Marx’s insight about the link between 
“individuality” and selfishness.33
Taken at face value, Manent’s survey of human-rights critics is a warning 
against the tendency towards “taking human rights for granted.”34 But he 
immediately adds that the very idea is “problematic.” We do not even have 
a clear notion of what human rights are, except perhaps that we live in a 
democracy whose purpose is to protect them. He points to an interesting 
study to be done, about the history of our institutions and how they were 
shaped by the declarations, but he puts this aside and diverts his attention 
to its “fundamental spiritual meaning.”35 Simply put, before 1789 the frame-
work in which man lived was not of human creation; man lived sub lege Dei. 
But henceforth the revelation of the Law of God was replaced by the “Rights 
of Man” (in uppercase). Man reached his maturity with the Enlightenment, 
adopting Kant’s motto: Sapere aude. Man has gone from heteronomy to 
autonomy. Obviously, free and equal birth is not a biological birth, but the 
“abandonment of the state of nature.”36 
30  Manent, A World beyond Politics?, 99.
31  Ibid., 100.
32  Ibid., 101.
33  Ibid., 104–5. 
34  Ibid., 101.
35  Ibid.
36  Ibid., 103.
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Only those who have been inattentive to Manent’s earlier thought will 
be surprised to find him among the human-rights discontents. But why 
exactly does Manent oppose human rights? There are evidently many species 
of skepticism, which Beitz, in a recent book, catalogs properly: those who 
question their feasibility, those who question their universality, those who 
question the very concept as vacuous, and so forth.37 Manent’s antagonism 
is not like that of Aron, who judged “rights talk” to be inconsistent, ineffec-
tive, and utopian, or that of Strauss which stressed their low, dogmatic, and 
incoherent character. Manent considers them to be extremely consistent38 
and very effective. Harking back to his first work on Tocqueville, Manent 
distinguishes the art of democracy from the nature of democracy,39 noting 
that “individualism” is recent. Individualism is not eternal “selfishness”: it is 
a feature of the man who isolates himself in a democracy, which fatally “dries 
up the public virtues.”
Manent comments extensively on the passage in which Tocqueville 
describes the transition from aristocracy to democracy.40 In aristocracy, 
man was always attached to something outside himself, to the point of self-
forgetfulness, while in democracies human bonds are both extended and 
loosened. But Manent seems even more dismayed than Tocqueville about the 
trade-off presented by the new situation: In aristocracies “one hardly thinks 
of dedicating oneself to the cause of humanity” because the notion of human 
nature is “obscured.” Democracy, on the other hand, follows a trend towards 
the denunciation of the “imposture of human bonds,” a denunciation that is 
implicit in what it is “to become an individual.” (Aron, by contrast, attached 
great importance to aristocratic “obscurity,” and never abandoned the 
aspiration, looming on a distant horizon, to the difficult recognition of the 
humanity of the “other.”)
For Manent, the main problem, what makes him skeptical, is that the 
idea of “humanity” is as empty of content as the man from Mesopotamia in 
Ortega y Gasset’s tale about Victor Hugo. Hugo, unable to recall anything 
significant about its people, greets the ambassador of Mesopotamia as the 
representative of “humanity.” For Manent, the feeling of humanity does not 
evoke any truly human figure, and this “void” gives rise to a new religion: the 
37  Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3–7.
38  But see Manent, La loi naturelle, 124.
39  Manent, A World beyond Politics?, 111.
40  Ibid., 111–20. The passage is Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. and trans. H. Mansfield and D. 
Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 482–83.
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religion of humanity based on the spiritual power of the scientists. This faint 
copy of Catholicism seems today a bit ridiculous, or would seem so, had it not 
been very much alive in the efforts to secularize Western society. Nietzsche 
was therefore right about the despicable platitude of the last man and his 
“invention of happiness,”41 which is a mere contentment. But Nietzsche’s 
alternative was to create new values: the idea of nature was almost forgotten.42 
The historical panorama, which is sometimes painted by Manent with 
broad strokes, has an undeniable vigor and accuracy. The novelty of human 
rights born after 1948 and expanding in the 1970s and 1980s, which some 
historians relate to the failure of all previous utopias,43 seems nevertheless 
forgotten in La loi naturelle et les droits de l’homme. The new book focuses 
instead on the project Manent put on the back burner but announced in his 
previous book: showing how our institutions have been shaped by human 
rights declarations. While seeking for the philosophical view behind the pres-
ent declarations (plural—they multiplied), it might at first glance be thought 
that their “novelty” should be sought in the more recent “wave of modernity” 
that arises from Nietzsche and is shaped by Heidegger. (Heidegger’s and 
Whitehead’s historicism certainly inspired Malik, one of the framers of the 
1948 declaration.) 
But that is not the route that Manent follows. Instead, he now looks into 
contemporary human rights and what he sees at their core is a Hobbesian 
world, built on “les conseils de la peur” and disfiguring the idea of Natural 
Law. That is, he looks into the “first wave” of modernity and into the city 
tanquam dissolutio (9) to explain the current success of the philosophy of 
human rights.
To be clearer, Manent flattens out what Strauss calls the various waves of 
modernity.44 Manent moves easily between the work of Machiavelli, Hobbes, 
and Rousseau, but ignores Nietzsche’s value creation and the wholly arbi-
trary dependence on the “spirit of the time” that Heidegger upholds and of 
which Charles Malik became a spokesman in the drafting—all of which seem 
to belong to Leo Strauss’s third wave of modernity. (It is true that even for 
41  Manent, A World beyond Politics?, 127.
42  Ibid., 128, 130.
43  Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2010) and Jean Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012) are the best accounts of the history of international human rights after 1948.
44  Leo Strauss, “The Three Waves of Modernity” (1975), in An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten 
Essays by Leo Strauss, ed. Hilail Gildin (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 81ff. 
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Strauss the germs of Heidegger are in Hobbes: we are all alone. We therefore 
have no duties. We are alone because we die alone. Anxiety is the deepest 
feeling. And feeling—passion—is deeper than reason). We may think, how-
ever, that Manent’s earlier intuition was well founded. During the drafting of 
the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the use of expressions found 
in the American Declaration of Independence (namely, to redact Article 1 as 
follows: “Created in the image and likeness of God, [men] are endowed with 
reason and conscience”), as well as a tribute to Locke and a possible reference 
to Natural Law, were discussed. The final wording resulted in what one scholar 
describes as “a bargain about God and nature.”45 Despite the profound influ-
ence of Christianity and other religions that resonates in expressions such 
as “shame” and “human dignity,” any references to God, nature, or reason 
were avoided. The document assumes that moral and political agreement can 
stand on its own without reference to any religion or philosophy. This type of 
moral-nonreligious theory is recent.46
We must perhaps move away from the idea that human rights are the 
result of a long and uninterrupted history and pay careful attention to the 
most recent changes in the understanding and advocacy of them. Although 
cultural changes are often difficult to date (the more so since they create their 
own prehistory), in other cases the breakdown is so overwhelming that it 
does not seem difficult to choose a moment. It seems to us that human rights 
as we conceive them in the international sphere are indeed very recent, and 
began in 1948 with the Universal Declaration.
The main change from modern natural law from 1948 to the present is 
that by default we are all historicists: we have difficulty imagining that every 
thought is not a function of time and place. Liberals used to be universalists, 
but today they prefer to appeal to liberalism’s “tradition” of human rights 
than to “natural rights.” Historicism is the basic presumption common to 
today’s democracy. We also assume that all philosophy is essentially histori-
cal, that is, that it is the expression of the spirit, “soul,” or situation of the time, 
and the (immutable) biological nature of man consists in his historical being.
45  Morsink, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 284–302.
46  Because widespread disbelief in God is so recent, “Non-Religious Ethics is at a very early stage” 
(Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons [Oxford: Clarendon, 1984], 454).
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IV
Whatever the case, Manent’s new book will stir some waves on an other-
wise quiet lake. On the seventieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration’s 
approval, Manent appears as the uninvited guest disturbing the celebration. 
The notion of natural law, he claims, has become unintelligible and at the 
same time scandalous: according to prevailing opinion, natural law subjects 
human life to a dogmatic truth about man and ignores what is more proper 
to man, his original freedom, which makes him the sovereign author of the 
human world. But, Manent points out, this makes us slaves of a necessar-
ily false or mutilated idea of ourselves. At the same time, our societies are 
subject to an ever more radical idea of human rights, on behalf of which the 
most venerable rules and institutions of civilization are reconstituted.
The book has the important virtue of clarifying why the considered idea of 
a universal human nature, or of “humanity as such,” is empty. The philosophy 
of human rights (in modernity, we add) was born against the idea of natural law 
in the Christian context, with recourse to the idea of a fictitious state of nature. 
A beginning in freedom replaces the biblical idea of a humanity under the law. 
Obviously, a reference to nature cannot be entirely avoided, and indeed the idea 
of the doctrine of human rights is based on a certain idea of nature, but its holder 
is the individual, separated from others, made concrete by his biological nature 
as a living being and only afterwards enriched by all social determinations (9). 
To mention “biological nature” is, however, somewhat inaccurate: “the biologi-
cal nature, being alive, is based on the sexual difference, which is the principle 
of reproduction and, therefore, the difference of generations. Now the nature 
that keeps men apart and free is the nature emptied of all ties, indifferent to the 
differences of sex, age or ability, the same for the members of the species. Nature 
devoid of inner complexity and depth, which teaches us nothing about what it 
is to be human, because a liberation from all ties, devoid of natural motives—
desires, inclinations, ideals—is not human” (10). 
Nature in modern philosophy is a raw fact that we can construct and 
deconstruct at will, like “Meccano.” It does not include any relation to “dis-
positions, purposes or institutions proper to human beings” (11) and with its 
silence affirms that there is nothing natural beyond the individual. The author-
ity of nature has not really been abolished, but it is not a “culture,” it does not 
imply a good society (13). The power of nature henceforth “translates” into 
the thirst for a permanent effort to rebuild the human world artificially (13), 
while reversing the rules of the public and the private. By this Manent means 
that human “identity” is for the moderns a choice, entirely denaturalized in 
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the name of human rights (15). Henceforth, what before was private is now a 
public matter: prevailing opinion turns sex into gender and turns homosexual 
deviance contrary to physical nature into a chosen orientation, and the desire 
of male and female for each other is but a social construction (16).
In short, Manent contends, human nature is never naked; it is only our 
cultural relativism that validates almost all the rules followed in other cul-
tures, at the same time as it judges and wants to reform all the rules followed 
here. Manent suggests the rationale behind such an idea of nature is an idea 
so poor that it would be compatible with all cultures. From this he goes on to 
argue that human nature cannot remain poor and naked. 
The presumed “evidence” of the endorsement of enlightened opinion 
leads the author to a retrospective of the origin of modern natural law, which 
forms the center of the small book, going back to Hobbes (and from Hobbes 
to Machiavelli), Rousseau, Luther, and so on. It is difficult to describe the 
depth of the intuitions that pervade the book, if not only because many theses 
may surprise the reader. To mention just a few insights: Machiavelli,who does 
not deal thematically with natural law (32), proves in fact that imaginary men 
are the real ones, because Machiavelli’s starting point is the “tanto discosto” 
(the great distance) between real and imaginary men (29), but it would not 
be possible to define a practical policy arising from Machiavelli’s words (37); 
Luther recognizes as equals the just and the sinner (45); the difficulty with 
Hobbes’s thought is not his unrealism, but his meaninglessness (53) because 
in the state of nature there are no rights, which cannot exist or can make no 
sense in a lawless world (56).
This latter idea is Manent’s point of support for the narrative of the 
construction of the modern state, which is inconceivable without the philo-
sophical elaboration that accompanies or guides its formation (93). The state 
is the apparatus that irresistibly produces the obedience of its “shareholders” 
(sociétaires) but it has a reverse: the state that claims obedience does not com-
mand or “order” the human world, or at least it ignores the principles of its 
order and lacks purpose. The modern state imposes peace within its borders, 
but it ignores the kind of peace it imposes because it lacks the inner sense 
that gives meaning to the external order of the human world (71). Moreover, 
in representative regimes the citizen does not obey; he consents. The archē of 
the polity is dismembered.
Manent’s new book is probably his most important and ambitious 
work, considering both the wide landscape he portrays and its originality. 
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Moreover, “without vanity” (120), near the end of his essay he advances a 
“simple” solution to the dilemmas involved in the inference of value state-
ments from statements about facts. These dilemmas tormented important 
modern philosophers, namely, Hume, Kant and all those in their wake who 
turned an absurd mouse into a mountain (to paraphrase Horace).47 Manent 
has been able to solve it, based on very modest principles (123) whose evalu-
ation he leaves to the reader (113): between the is and the ought there is no 
abyss or pit, just a gentle slope (pente douce).
Carefully considered, according to Manent, all proper human action 
implies a balance between three motives, the “agreeable,” the “useful,” and 
the “honest,” which includes the fair and noble (bonum honestum bonum 
utile bonum delectabile).48 No human being is moved by something that does 
not belong to this trilogy of goods (114). Manent does not define the “scho-
lastic concepts” but they have roots in classical ethics. The good man acts 
with a view to the noble,49 but to be happy every man needs external goods 
(loosely, the useful), goods of the body (the agreeable) as much as he seeks 
the goods of the soul, which are superior (or in Aquinas the moral good, 
bonum honestum).50According to Manent no one is able to evade the force 
or power over human action of these three motives, and no one can modify 
this “rule of action” at will. It is part of our common nature as men. The ideas 
of the honest or noble have a particular plasticity and vary greatly with time 
and place, which explain the “infinite diversity of laws and customs” that the 
social sciences discover and that might, in ignorance of this plasticity, seem 
incompatible with the stability and constancy of human nature.
Manent judges that the phenomenology of this diversity does not affect 
the practical man, who is always moved by the same three motives (115, 119), 
which are found everywhere (like fire in Persia and Greece, we assume). They 
are the source of the rules of justice accepted by all; they provide the criteria 
47  Manent reverses the famous saying: “parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus” (the mountains 
are in labor, [and] an absurd mouse will be born) (Horace, Ars poetica, 136–39).
48  Aquinas, Summa theologiae II-II q. 145, a. 3; Cicero, De invent. rhet. 2.53. See, on this terminology, 
Stephen F. Brown, Thomas Dewender, and Theo Kobusch, eds., Philosophical Debates at Paris in the 
Early Fourteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 169ff.
49  Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.1.1120a20–25, etc. 
50  But if Manent is looking for perennial “motives” (as opposed to “goods”) of the action, he does not 
really evade controversy, considering that per Hume, Christian virtues such as “celibacy, fasting, pen-
ance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues” 
are neither agreeable nor useful. On the contrary they “stupefy the understanding and harden the 
heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper” (David Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of 
Morals [Oxford: Clarendon, 2006]). 
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for the rules of human action. Such rules of action are the essence of Natural 
Law, but they cannot be isolated from a culture or particular “city.”
Moreover, these rules do not apply only to man in isolation—to a Robin-
son Crusoe on an island—but make it possible to evaluate “a society, a regime, 
an institution that does not make enough room for the three main ‘motives’ 
and therefore to evaluate whether such a society, regime or institution is 
against Natural Law” (120). Manent at this point offers his most unfortunate 
example: communist regimes (like all regimes) can be assessed by the impor-
tance they attach to the three human goods. Communist regimes showcase 
themselves to the most naive of travelers as regimes not providing enough 
room to the “useful” and the “agreeable” (122) and thus making it possible 
to immediately establish that they are not in accordance with Natural Law. 
Oddly, nothing is said by Manent about police, political prisons, concentra-
tion camps, torture, censorship, freedom of thought, oppressive “secular 
religions,” the Big Lie, or, in general, tyranny in communist regimes.51
Manent seems to think that such a “simple and concrete criterion” (123) 
as he lays out allows us to judge the adequacy of a regime, but his critique of 
communism seems superficial. Raymond Aron asserted more clearly than 
Manent the difference between regimes that have imperfections and the 
“essential imperfection” of totalitarian regimes. Moreover, the poverty of the 
evaluation of regimes seems inadequate when compared to Manent’s own 
criticism of modern representative democracy. With such a “simple and con-
crete criterion” as Manent gives us, Plato’s presentation of his best city and 
Aristotle’s dialectical presentation of his politeia would be much abridged. 
Manent is of course right to argue that it is appalling to see how eas-
ily “eminent modern philosophers” such as Kant accepted without question 
the Humean dichotomy between means (which we can evaluate on the basis 
of a “moral arithmetic”) and ends, so freely chosen that it is impossible to 
rationally evaluate or decide between our goals, be it the destruction of the 
whole world or the scratching of a finger. However, it seems that Manent’s 
alternative gentle slope could also lead us to an abyss or a pit. The reader may 
find himself hesitant to agree with Manent’s modest principles.
V
Let us avoid any ambiguity. We find it sound to recover the idea that natural 
right is in the first place the natural order of virtues or “the natural perfec-
tions of the human soul (cf. Laws 765E–766A), as well as the natural order 
51  Cf. Taylor, Thick and Thin, 63–64.
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of the other things that are by nature good.”52 Such an approach is very dif-
ferent from the usual inference of a set rules of natural law with no ifs and 
buts, derived from an abstract idea of human nature. Strauss, for example, 
went even further than Manent and stated in a letter to Helmut Khun that if 
justice is taken as all-inclusive virtue, this (Platonic) doctrine of “the order 
of the soul and of the order of the virtues is the doctrine of natural right.”53
But it was not without reason that Strauss preferred to speak of “natural 
right” instead of Natural Law, as Manent and Maritain do, and the differ-
ence is substantial. This was not only because the conjunction of “nature” and 
law” is in a way an oxymoron, law being manmade and therefore necessarily 
nonnatural. Nor was it simply because the idea of Natural Law implies a “leg-
islator,” as in the prephilosophical idea of a divine law common to all peoples, 
or in a theological context such as we find in Aquinas.54
Strauss however expressed his view as follows: “There is a universally 
valid hierarchy of ends, but there are no universally valid rules of action.”55 
He judged that such hierarchy was insufficient to assess what is right here and 
now. He moreover deemed that even premodern natural right in the classical 
tradition of natural right was not of the kind that can be expounded as a 
scheme independent of all positive law. Premodern natural right was instead, 
he argued, the framework for all positive law. Manent’s “simple” scheme is, 
by contrast, a scheme.
Jacques Maritain, from an explicit Christian or theological perspective, 
devised a gradual continuity between natural law, the “common law” (as 
manifested in the jus gentium), and positive law (droit positif). That is why he 
deemed useful a positive “law” stating the rights of man.56 
Manent therefore deviates from Aron, Strauss, and Maritain, and upholds 
a strict opposition between natural law and human rights, and in fact re-
charters the field of human rights philosophy. But we may wonder if such 
“language” is in fact entirely useless for addressing any and all practical ques-
tions, here and now, and for justifying political action at home and abroad.
52  Leo Strauss, “Natural Law,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills 
(New York: Macmillan, 1968), 11:80. 
53  Strauss, letter to Helmut Khun, n.d., Independent Journal of Philosophy, no. 2 (1978): 24.
54  G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33,  no. 124 (January 1958): That “the 
concept of legislation requires superior power in the legislator” seems commonsensical. 
55  Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 162.
56  Maritain, Droits de l’homme, 72–73, 75.
